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INTRODUCTION. TWO QUESTIONS 1
“If men were angels, no government would be necessary,” 2  suggests Publius. Hence, it is in the
human nature that the roots of government are found. The raison d’être of government is a central
question of the field called political theory or political philosophy. Besides the investigation of the
purpose of government, political philosophers, from the Ancients to the Moderns, have reflected on
the function of political philosophy and, not surprisingly, on the relationship between political activity
and philosophical activity. In the context of this essay, I shall transform this set of questions into a
twofold question: the meta question and the political question.
The meta question investigates the notion of political philosophy and subsequently its function. The
definition of political philosophy constitutes the starting point of the discussion. The inquiry of political
philosophy entails the reflection on human nature, which is necessary since men are no angels. In
this debate, the idea of natural right transcends the meta question. Whereas some philosophers
believe that there is such a natural right, others refute this claim. The following point concerns the
relationship between theory and practice. Should political philosophy be confined to the room of
theory or enter the political arena? If so, how do philosophers influence political practice? The
conclusion of the meta question considers the potential end of philosophy.
The political question studies the origins of government, the reasons for which men agree to unite
into political organizations. The responses to the meta question laid the foundations for the
explanations of such notions as social contract, civil state or constitution, and commonwealth. On the
basis of these explorations, the question of the best regime can be answered. Eventually, the
continuum between preservation (of the government) and revolution is given attention. This theme
raises the question of what happens once a government has been established. Political philosophers
have reflected on the manner how to preserve a political regime (especially by looking at the
relationship between the ruled and the rulers) as well as, for some of them, on the age-old question
is there a right to overthrow a government.
I shall attempt to answer these two fundamental questions by providing a forum of dialogue between
eight major political philosophers: four Ancients – Aristotle, John Locke, Publius (Alexander Hamilton,
James Madison, and John Jay), and Immanuel Kant – and four Moderns – Leo Strauss, Alasdair
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MacIntyre, Michael Oakeshott, and Hannah Arendt. 3  The paper starts with the conversation
between the eight thinkers on the meta question. And, on the basis of the answers to the meta
question, the dialogue continues over the political question in the second part of the essay.
THE META QUESTION. WHAT IS POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY?
Since Man has mastered speech, the meta question has been asked: what is philosophy, in general,
and political philosophy, in particular? The question of its function follows. Ancient and modern
philosophers have devoted a substantial part of their life to an attempt to answer the meta question.
Their theoretical framework, i.e. their approaches, have diverged widely. How can we answer the
meta question?
In The Nichomachean Ethics, Aristotle sets out to discover the good life for man. The resolution of
the question human life’s purpose is a pre-requisite for organizing ourselves collectively since the
latter consideration will depend on the answer to the former question. Aristotle sees man as a
political animal, a speech animal. 4  Reason voiced by speech enables man to perceive – and by
application talk about – what is just and unjust, right and wrong. 5  Aristotle’s view refers to natural
teleology (i.e. the idea of natural right): if we engage in logos and pursue it, we will be led to the
discovery of our true nature: happiness or eudaimonia 6 , which is not a state of feeling but an
activity. 7  One is fulfilled by the contemplation of such reflections as the rationale for politics, the
whole and the political, one’s relation to the whole. Aristotle’s Ethics is designed to explain what is
good 8  – and especially the highest good – and how we might set about building societies and
institutions that offer the conditions of the contemplative life 9 , which is the activity in accordance
with the excellence of the best part of us – that is, reason. 10  Therefore, not only is philosophy in
service of politics, but also politics are in service of philosophy: statesmen must set out the
conditions of the contemplative life. 11
Although reason is in the heart of Kant’s philosophy, too, Kant differs considerably from Aristotle.
Kant provides men “the” solution in a “pre-packaged” philosophy. Whereas Aristotle studies what is
good, Kant tells us what to do. Above all, the categorical imperative guides us in our decision-making
process.
According to John Locke, our choice must confirm our will to reason. 12  We have a duty as human
beings to live freely, to commit ourselves to freedom. In contrast, Hobbes emphasizes the avoidance
of death – the fear of sudden death from the hands of another human being – as the common
denominator to unite in a society. Locke goes beyond this instrumental view. Men are obligated to
figure out what way of life is conducive to both our preservation and to the use of reason. 13  Thus,
the Lockean man has the potential to be reasonable 14 , but he needs to be enlightened – and
that is the task of political philosophers. Moreover, philosophers’ function is also to warn, or to
illuminate, those in authority of men’s rights. 15  These two roles of political philosophy apprehend
a unique relationship: on the one hand, the citizens made conscious of their rights through reason,
and, on the other hand, the rulers made aware of the citizens’ rights. Locke wants to show that there
is a natural connection between our self-concern and political society, the link between
reasonableness and self-concern. Foremost, freedom is not license. 16  This is a normative
dimension that implies that man is accountable for his own conduct. 17
For Leo Strauss, political philosophy pursues the goal to acquire knowledge of the good life and of
the good society. 18  It deals with political matters “in a manner that is meant to be relevant for
political life.” 19  In contrast, political theory covers “the comprehensive reflections on the political
situation which lead up to the suggestion of broad policy.” 20  Political philosophy is vital to the
study of political things because it asks the question of the purpose of political society (i.e. the so
what question). The study of the great works – the Classics – is crucial since they articulate in the
most effective way the fundamental problem of political life and present the most effective arguments
for the solution. Therefore, before engaging in empirical studies, we should understand the end that
we want to bring about. In contrast, positivism fails to raise the evaluative question and as a
consequence, our society, built on the positivist framework, hides its own prejudices behind a façade
of ethical neutrality.
Natural right
The concept of natural right transcends the field of political philosophy: some claim that there is such
a natural right, while others contend that there is none.
The quest of the good is the crux of man’s existence. Leo Strauss asserts that “man cannot live
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without light, guidance, knowledge; only through knowledge of the good can he find the good that he
needs.” 21  The timeless truth can be apprehended through philosophical activity; the solution is
available to us by way of dialectic – yet it demands effort. 22  Strauss encourages us to learn from,
instead of to learn about; the latter manner would be mere stamp collecting. The “so what question”
cannot not be asked. By virtue of being human we possess reason and are able to give, after a
thorough examination or a fair hearing, a critical judgment. We can articulate that power (of
reasoning) by way of language; therefore, a dialogue is possible between men. 23
In opposition, McIntyre believes that our language is so historically informed that we cannot
participate at this meeting of minds (dialogue). 24  In order to understand fully any conception of
justice of a tradition, one must be a member of that particular tradition, for individuals are so
embedded in their tradition that they cannot extract themselves from their own conception. 25
Hannah Arendt, as a liberal herself, encounters the impasse of liberal thought, which wishes to
create the conditions for freedom, but does not ask the purpose of freedom: the so what question is
not asked. Strauss agrees that we need the conditions that the U.S. Constitution provides, a free
society is invaluable, but then we need to reconnect freedom to virtue. If we fail to do so, the danger
of totalitarianism lies before us. We need to anchor the conditions of freedom to the question of the
noble life, of virtue. Hannah Arendt does not go as far. According to her, political action is an end in
itself: one realizes his/her freedom through action.
MacIntyre observes the failure of the enlightenment. 26  Modern liberalism, as the product of
enlightenment, does not ask the question of the best way of life, since it assumes there is no
overriding good, but turns to the question of how to balance the different equivalent ways of life.
MacIntyre criticizes the modern liberal thought for not recognizing the interconnectedness of all
moral commitment. 27  In their critiques of modern liberalism – which assumes that there is no
overriding good – Strauss and MacIntyre converge, yet their thoughts diverge when it comes to the
question of the good life. Whereas for Strauss the question of the good life can be answered
through dialogue, for MacIntyre one cannot understand somebody else’s tradition since one’s point
of view is biased by its traditional legacy. 28
Oakeshott diverges from Aristotle and Strauss; although the latter two believe that philosophy can
apprehend natural thought that is timeless – and this activity is part of political philosophy – the
former does not contend that philosophy is in any way metaphysical or should even posit the myth
of natural right. Furthermore, the very idea of natural right transcends the politics of faith – of which
he is very much afraid. 29
Theory and Practice
Should political philosophy be confined in the room of theory or should it enter the political arena?
In establishing a new Constitution, the founding Fathers utilize the new science of politics. They
make use of philosophy to promote their political action. 30  Their enterprise is very practical –
therefore they need to reflect on experience and prudence 31 ; it is an opportunity to test the
ongoing theoretical debate. 32  For the Founders, politics can be studied; similarly Aristotle sees
them as a body of knowledge, 33  and therefore they can be structured. So the new science of
politics cannot displace politics: it must be designed to accommodate political life rather than solving
“the” political question. Publius agrees with Aristotle: political conflicts are here to stay. Hence, the
best political system should try to incorporate political conflicts and, above all, not be vulnerable to
them. 34  In opposition, Kant maintains that politics equal conflicts. 35  Thus, if we go away from
politics, we overcome political conflicts. 36  Eventually, inferring from Oakeshott’s theoretical
framework, the abolition of politics is a consequence of the enthusiastic politics of faith.
Kant’s thought diverges not only on the views that politics entail conflicts but also, and especially, on
the function of political philosophy which according to him should stay confined to the room of theory.
Yet, he suggests that philosophers are “free teachers of right”. Their role is to educate citizens in
order to transform them from self-interested human beings to moral human beings. In addition, states
are to embrace and cultivate moral rationalism via political philosophy.
The reading of Michael Oakeshott’s essays shows a tension in his view of the function of political
philosophy. On the one hand, political philosophy must be understood as “an explanatory, not a
practical, activity.” 37  Philosophy clarifies the world in which we live or the assumptions that
people make when they undertake various activities. In other words, the activity of philosophy gives
the key to understanding human activities in regard to their own pursuits. The philosopher cannot
contribute to politics as such. Thus, strictly speaking, philosophy is not relevant for political practice:
the philosopher ought to be disengaged and not engaged in the political round. On the other hand,
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while examining Oakeshott’s work it seems that he admits that the very activity of clarification does,
at the end, shape our moral values. In The Politics of Faith and The Politics of Scepticism, Michael
Oakeshott exhorts – and helps – us to undertake the enterprise of clarifying the poles of political
activities. This enterprise can give us eventually some kind of illumination that can potentially guide
us in the political arena. 38
Although Alasdair MacIntyre, Hannah Arendt, and Michael Oakeshott see political communities as
very complex communities with their own history, they disagree on the task of the philosophers and
politicians. For the first two, it is in and through a community that we become fully human, we are
speeches being. Both argue that it belongs to the philosophers and not only the government to
enable the communities to be more coherent within themselves, to improve the practice of any
particular community. Conversely, Oakeshott is willing to live with some tension within a given
community: the task of the philosopher is separate from the task of the government, which is to keep
the ship afloat.
Finally, Strauss’s insight is that we cannot talk about politics without evaluating them and
consequently we should practically respond to that evaluation. This implication of the philosopher in
the political practice contrasts with Oakeshott’s denigration of the political activity. Michael Oakeshott
does not see the latter activity as having a vast importance, contrarily to Aristotle for whom politics is
an architectonic art.
The End of Philosophy
Aristotle and Strauss believe that philosophy can die out or that the absence of free inquiry may
prevent philosophical activities. Yet, different remedies exist. Hannah Arendt suggests that self-
participation in the political web would preserve freedom. Here appears Arendt’s literally
understanding of Aristotle’s notion of man as a political animal. According to her, man is fulfilled by
participation in the political realm. Indeed, this view restricts Aristotle’s understanding of man as a
political animal who, for he possesses reason voiced by speech, can apprehend the notions of just
and unjust, right and wrong. 39
In order to preserve freedom, Leo Strauss urges us to go back to the Ancients’ notions, ideas and
arguments because they remind us of arguments that our own culture does not automatically bring to
the debate. These ideas of the Ancients are important in preserving freedom.
Foremost, Aristotle and Strauss contend that as long as people discuss, the possibility of raising the
question of the best life still exists and therefore, the actual way of life would be challenged. Reason
compels to reason more.
THE POLITICAL QUESTION. WHAT (IS) GOVERNMENT?
Having discussed the function of political philosophy, it appears that the raison d’être of government
constitutes a central theme of political philosophy. In this section, I both discuss the source of
government – the reason why people decide to unite into an organized political society – and the
form of that organization. Eventually, I turn to the life of governments: their preservation and their
end.
The Raison d’Être of Government
At the end of The Nichomachean Ethics, having set out the good life for man, Aristotle introduces
the role of the polis in providing man “the proper equipment” 40  to live the contemplative life:
legislation is needed if the end is to be attained and thus it must create the conditions which would
enable man to pursue a life of contemplation. 41  Ethics and politics are not separate in Aristotle’s
philosophy, whereas The Ethics urges man to pursue the highest good, The Politics applies this
ideal to the city. By nature 42 , men join in a city to form a partnership which “aims at the most
authoritative good of all”, happiness. 43  Aristotle’s teleological account continues: the city develops
in order to fulfill  our true human nature; the city completes us a human being since it enables us to
exercise speech through which we can address the moral questions of right and wrong, just and
unjust. Therefore, the polis aims at fostering human excellence.
Similarly, the Founders support the idea that the government should create the conditions for
freedom. Moreover, Aristotle and the Founding Fathers agree on the division, even though the line
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might be very fine, between the public and private spheres. Government ought not to enter the latter
sphere: it is not its business to make man happy but rather to set the stage where happiness can be
pursued.
According to Locke, the purpose of government is to secure each citizen’s life, liberty, and
estate 44  since there is no security and safety for the property in the sate of nature. 45  Every
individual is urged by one’s natural impulse of self-preservation to unite into commonwealths. 46
Therefore, men agree 47  to form a society where all their forces are put together under a
government whose form is chosen by the majority. 48  The legislative power, 49  established by
the first and fundamental positive law of all commonwealths, is “not only the supreme power of the
commonwealth, but sacred and unalterable in the hands where the community have once placed
it.” 50  The power of the government must be limited by the end for which it was formed – the
preservation of the society. 51
The idea of contractualism filters through Kant’s philosophy. His civil state, i.e. commonwealth, is
founded on an original contract between men, which is of an exceptional nature. 52  The civil
constitution has an end in itself that all individuals part of this union ought to share. The end is “the
right of men under coercive public laws by which each can be given what is due to him and secured
against attack from any others.” 53  Thus, the civil constitution is a relationship among free men
who are subject to coercive laws; 54  this is the requirement of reason, which legislates a priori,
regardless of all empirical ends (i.e. the quest for individual happiness). 55  In a civil state, Kant
claims that “no one can compel me to be happy in accordance with his conception of the welfare of
others, for each may seek happiness in whatever way he sees fit” (which explains why governments
should not seek to provide happiness, moreover they would go wrong in the definition of this very
concept of happiness), “so long as he does not infringe upon the freedom of the others to pursue a
similar end which can be reconciled with the freedom of everyone else within a workable general
law” 56  – i.e. he must accord to others the same right as he enjoys himself. 57
Reflecting on the European politics, Michael Oakeshott apprehends the different views on
government through a continuum linking two poles: the politics of faith and the politics of scepticiscm.
European politics has moved and moves between these two poles for the last five hundred years.
“In the politics of faith,” explains Michael Oakeshott, “the activity of governing is understood to be in
the service of human perfection; perfection itself is understood to be a mundane condition of human
circumstances; and the achievement of perfection is understood to depend upon human effort.” 58
Thus, an omnipotent government is needed in order to direct the activities of its subjects, “either so
that they contribute to the improvements which in turn converge upon perfection, or (in another
version) so that they conform to the pattern imposed.” 59  This latter version bears the risk to
transform into totalitarianism. Hence, Oakeshott seems to favor the politics of scepticism which does
not promote a one-best-way and one-best-end; for the politics of skepticism “has its roots either in
the radical belief that human perfection is an illusion, or in the less radical belief that we know too
little about the conditions of human perfection for it too be wise to concentrate our energies in a
single direction.” 60  Therefore, the office of government is to maintain arrangements, the
“superficial order,” 61  within which every citizen can safely pursue its own end.
Aristotle and Oakeshott share the – skeptic – view of the government to be an association (civil for
Oakeshott) where political activities are balanced between each other. But in the same time, Aristotle
provides an understanding of the human nature that is meant to have political influence. Aristotle,
like Oakeshott, is very wary of the danger of trying to reach the perfection in a particular way of the
political round. But Aristotle does not want to let go the notion of human excellence: the statesmen
are to shape life as to foster human excellence, nobility. In contrast, Oakeshott is a libertarian:
people should be left alone if they want to pursue perfection in a particular way. He does want to
provide the political foundations to build an Aristotelian society.
Hannah Arendt, in Human Condition, sees the political realm as a web of political participation. Only
by the way of such a participation can we become true human being. 62  Her view is contingent to
the notion that all citizens are politically active. 63  Furthermore, she observes that theorists
distinguish two kinds of social contract: between the people to make society or between the ruler
and the ruled to legitimate the government. 64  Yet, she claims there are aspects of a single
twofold contract. 65  Above all, the chief idea behind this single contract is that men can escape
from the state of nature 66  by binding themselves into a community “which, even though it was
composed of ‘sinners’, need not necessarily reflect this ‘sinful’ side of human nature.” 67  Arendt’s
conception is inherited from the Founding Fathers whose realism (or even pessimism 68 ) with
respect to human nature contrasted with enlightenment philosophers’ proposition that man is good in
some original state. 69  Publius believed that there is a possibility of checking human nature via
common bonds and natural promises. 70  Meanwhile, the Founders mistrusted power and feared a
too powerful government, which would be an enormous danger for the rights and liberties of the
citizens. 71
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On the basis of these different visions of government, we can now turn to the exploration of the
question of the best regime.
The Best Regime
Before answering the question of the best regime, Aristotle classifies regimes. 72  His classification
is based on two main features: on the on hand, whether the regime serves the ruler(s) or the ruled,
and on the other hand, whether the government is concentrated in one person or shared by a few or
by the many. 73  In book III and IV of The Politics, he presents three true forms of government –
monarchy, aristocracy, and constitutional republic – and three perverted forms – tyranny, oligarchy,
and democracy. 74
Theoretically, if someone is outstanding on the basis of virtue, according to Aristotle, he should be
the sole ruler and therefore, “what remains – and it seems the natural course – is for everyone to
obey such a person gladly, so that persons of this sort will be permanent kings in their cities.” 75
Yet, the absence of such people renders monarchy out of consideration. Similarly, true aristocracy is
hardly ever found in its uncorrupted form. Thus, ideal preferences set aside, the constitutional
republic is regarded as the best attainable form of government, especially as it secures the
predominance of the middling element. 76  Foremost, the best state will enable anyone to act in
the best and live in the happiest manner. To serve this purpose, the state should be self-
sufficient. 77
In the American constitutional debate, 78  the question of the best regime could not be avoided.
Following, Rousseau and Montesquieu, the so-called anti-federalists argued that the republican
government 79  is best to be established on a small territory since on a larger territory the
government would be to remote from the people and the risk of becoming despotic would be
high. 80  In contrast, although the federalists were very much aware of the risks of the tyranny of
the majority and of factions, they maintained that the implementation of mechanisms would control
these threats and therefore, render the republican government viable. Thus, the size of the
territory 81  and the structure of the regime 82  address the diseases of tyranny and of factions.
Moreover, for the Founders, the roots of these diseases are in the nature of men. Men’s nature is a
latent cause of faction – therefore they are inevitable. 83  Hence, statesmen may be not able to
enlighten the people because they are not enlightened themselves. Because of this skeptical view, it
follows that any human being could not apprehend the common good, since it is too remote of a
concept, and thus, building a political system should meet the two following requirements: on the
one hand, the system should encourage virtuous men to govern, but on the other hand, the system
should be structured as it would be successful even if the men in office are not virtuous. In that
regard, the American Constitution reflects Oakeshott’s politics of scepticism.
The study of the Founders would have complicated MacIntyre’s argument against liberal
societies. 84  Liberal society needs, according to the Founding Fathers, the concept of virtue and
excellence. Toleration as itself as a good is important but liberal society is not established on
toleration but on virtue and excellence. The political question is how to allow enough freedom in
order to enable anyone to pursue its own happiness but without falling into disorder and chaos. Here,
the Lockean “liberty is not license” is ever present.
The understanding of the relationship between the ruler and the ruled differentiates Kant’s autocratic
republican ruler and Publius’ idea of representation. According to the Founders, the function of
representation is to enlarge and refine the public view. 85  The politicians make more reasonable
the view of their constituents, i. e. they make democracy more reasonable. Conversely, Kant argues
that the autocratic republican ruler should rule as if those over him he is ruling would consent to his
policies; the rulers do not have to listen to the ruled; they can disregard the opinions of the
citizens. 86  Moreover, in Kant’s vision, superior representatives, chosen through elections, are not
needed since everyone is capable, for the categorical imperative guides anyone’s decisions.
The existence of a best regime opposes MacIntyre’s and Strauss’ thoughts. Although the former
acknowledges that within a tradition one best regime can raise, he denies the possibility that one
best regime can exist across traditions since any regime reflects the thought of the tradition which
breeds it. 87  In contrast, Strauss argues that dialogue between philosophers from various traditions
can lead to the definition of the best regime. At least, this regime will set out the conditions to allow
these meetings of minds to take place and thus, favor philosophical activity.
Michael Oakeshott distinguishes two types of government: the civil association and the enterprise
association. Behind the idea of the civil association is the politics of faith, the politics of scepticism
echoes in the enterprise association. 88  Both Oakeshott and Arendt are afraid of the
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predominance of the politics of faith and see in the politics of skepticism the only way to live and
therefore favor the idea of the civil association. However, whereas for Oakeshott a judicial activity
that preserves the rule of law suffices, Arendt’s vision of the political web needs such a judicial
system but goes further by requiring a full political participation. For the latter, there is an urgency for
political action. In contrast, Oakeshott is eloquently aware of the differences among individuals and
the propensity of many individuals to be silent politically. These individuals desire to live in their own
way and perspective, which explains the very importance of a judicial system which allows everyone
to carry out their own life. Similarly, Locke anchors the system in checks and balances as well as in
the rule of law. His system is not contingent by the participation of everyone, and protects all
whether they are politically active or not.
Preservation and Revolution
To conclude the discussion of the political question, we need to investigate the question of how to
preserve the life of government, and for some philosophers, the question of the right of revolution.
However, since the concepts of rebellion and revolution rely on a modern premise, not all
philosophers have examined the right of rebellion and revolution.
Aristotle addresses the question of the prevention of revolution (by the actions of the rulers
themselves). What are the sources of preservation for regimes? How can regimes be preserved?
Aristotle distinguishes factional conflicts – that result from inequality – and revolutions. Revolutions
occur in two ways: either there is a change of regime or a shift of power in the same regime. 89
He highlights the concept of justice and sees inequality as the chief cause of revolution. People
believe that they deserve more power than they are getting. Therefore, Aristotle urges 90  the rulers
to avoid wanton behavior, to treat everyone well inside and outside the governing body, and above
all, make sure that small things, especially transgressions of the laws, do not transform into conflicts
or a revolution. 91
Locke grounds the right of revolution in the rhetoric of pre-political inalienable rights. 92  If the
government threatens the preservation of property by a long train of attacks to life, liberty, and
estate, Locke argues that the natural response is collective self-defense. 93  Furthermore, Aristotle
and Locke share the views that oppressive governments are what causes revolution. Therefore the
“best fence against rebellion” is to encourage leaders to avoid engaging in tyrannical behavior and
“act contrary to the end for which they were constituted” 94  – the preservation of property. Yet, the
rulers tend to succumb to the temptations of power and, above all, power has a corrupting
influence. 95  Thus, Locke’s message emphasizes chiefly the danger of overreaching on the part of
those in power. 96
In opposition, Kant’s view on the question of revolution seems clear; rebellion, as he posits, “is the
greatest and most punishable crime in a commonwealth, for it destroys its very foundations.” 97
And he continues: “this prohibition is absolute.” 98  There is no right of revolution even though the
head of state or the government has violated the original contract by acting tyrannically. 99  In that
case, the subjects are not entitled to offer counter-resistance since the people, under an existing
civil constitution, have no longer any right to judge how the constitution should be administered even
though they conserve their other rights. 100  It follows that it exists no right to undo the new order
either, once a revolution has taken place, “for it is men’s duty to obey as citizens.” 101  Therefore,
Kant concludes that “freedom of the pen is the only safeguard of the rights of the people.” 102
Similarly, Leo Strauss maintains that the power of the pen is not negligible. In Persecution and the
Art of Writing, he argues that in the context of persecution “a peculiar technique of writing” develops,
“in which the truth about all crucial things is presented exclusively between the lines.” 103
Moreover, only a few trustworthy and intelligent readers can comprehend the message. That illusive
style of literature has numerous advantages among them being private and public communication in
the same time and above all, avoiding the risk of capital punishment for the author.
MacIntyre sees the preservation of a tradition through epistemological crises. 104  Epistemological
crises constitute key moments in the development of a tradition as they occur at times when their
argument is not coherent anymore. Hence, the task of political philosophers is to reformulate the
rationale in a more cogent manner. Although the crises take place at an epistemological level, the
repercussions on the political life are essential since the tradition engenders the political thought
which reigns in the polity. For instance, the division over the issue of slavery obliged the liberal
tradition to resolve that internal conflict in order to bring peace in the society.
Hannah Arendt claims that revolution is generally misunderstood as it is confused with the concept of
liberation. 105  Liberation is assumed to be a revolution but a true revolution established the
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conditions for free political speech by way of speech itself. 106  She draws her theory from the
study the American and the French revolutions. The outcomes of these two revolutions diverge
because they responded to different circumstances. The French countered an absolute monarchy
with another form of absolutism 107 , it “absolutized” the power of the people in the form of the
equal will. This “absolutization” brought about the coincidence of law and power. Post-revolutionary
France was a nationalistic regime, ruled by the majority, or worse the tyranny of the majority. 108
Therefore, this new society was not a truly free society: not everyone was equal in participatory
power. 109
In contrast, the American revolution although it was theoretically informed by the idea of natural right
as embodied in the Declaration of Independence, was constituted in practice through political
speech. The Constitution of the United States was a bottom-up achievement which found its origin in
the people themselves. In Arendt’s view, the fact that the U.S. Constitution was so constituted and
not with a theoretical natural law is what saved the Americans from the consequences of the French
Revolution. 110
To conclude, for Hannah Arendt, revolution brings about political freedom and renders everyone
politically equal. Her definition, which focuses on political liberty, diverges from the Marxist idea of
revolution which is to bring about socio-economic equality. Here, Oakeshott’s framework illuminates
Arendt’s and Marx’s view of the purpose of revolution. Whereas, revolution leads to the
establishment of the politics of scepticism for the former, revolution is guided by the ideal of faith for
the latter.
CONCLUSIONS. MEETING OF MINDS
The raison d’être of this paper was to provide a forum of dialogue to eight major philosophers.
Although some twenty-three centuries separate them, it seems that they have never stopped
conversing with one another on the crucial questions of philosophy, in general, and political
philosophy, in particular. In this essay, a twofold question was raised: the meta question and the
political question. What is political philosophy? And what is government?
Aristotle’s philosophy starts with the premise that man is a political animal. A political animal who
can, through speech, apprehend the notions of just and unjust, right and wrong. Aristotle’s man aims
at happiness, which is an activity and not a state. That activity is the contemplative life. His
reflections will lead the Aristotleian man to discover what is the best way of life and therefore,
because ethics and politics are not separate, what is the best regime and how to best preserve it
once established.
Locke believes in the reasonableness of man. Reason compels the Lockeian man to unite into a
commonwealth in order to ensure safety for his property (i.e. life, liberty, and estate). Thus the
government is limited to the preservation of its subjects’ property and conditional to that preservation.
Should it fail, the subjects have the right to revolt.
Kant provides man with a “pre-packaged” philosophy. The categorical imperative guides the Kantian
man through his private and public life. The public life is organized in a civil state built on an original
contract – though fictional – which ensures every citizen’s enjoyment of freedom as long he does not
impinge on anyone’s else freedom. The preservation of that order does not leave room for any right
to revolt except by means of writing.
Publius faces the tremendous task to establish a new order. In his practical enterprise, he has the
opportunity to test the theoretical debate: to use theory to shape practice. The result is a regime
which allows freedom and therefore the pursuit of virtue and excellence since mechanisms of checks
and balances as well as an enlarged territory control for factional conflicts.
Strauss’ philosophy urges man to pursue the ideal of natural right. The Straussian man should learn
from instead of learn about. The dialogue between philosophers leads to the perception of the good,
which afterwards can be used in the political practice.
MacIntyre’s reflections force him to acknowledge the failure of the enlightenment project since it
offers man a set of moral injunctions without explaining the very end of man – because for the
philosophers “des lumières” there is no overriding good. However, although the good can be defined
within a particular tradition, the MacIntyreian man cannot apprehend the rationale of any tradition but
his, for he cannot extract himself from his historically conditioned standpoint.
Oakeshott’s framework for politics provides an understanding of the politics which evolves between
two poles whose charges are the politics of faith – which leads a society towards perfection – and
the politics of skepticism – which sets the conditions for freedom and thus enables anyone to pursue
its own perfection.
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Hannah Arendt’s man has to engage in the political round to reach its end: being a political animal.
To attain his goal, the Arendtian man needs freedom which only a true revolution can bring about.
The meeting of minds has nourished the philosophical debate since man has mastered speech. As
long as man will be a speech animal, the dialogue will go on and reason shall prevail.
December 2005
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13/1/08 18:08Cahier n°11 - The Political Philosophy of Eight Major – Political – Thi…blius, Kant, Strauss, MacIntyre, Oakeshott, and Arendt - Décembre 2007
Page 11 sur 14http://popups.ulg.ac.be/csp/document.php?id=212&format=print
39 See, e.g., ARISTOTLE, The Politics, at 37 (book I.2).
40 Already at the beginning of The Ethics, Aristotle suggested that “happiness needs the external goods;
for it is impossible, or not easy, to do noble acts without the proper equipment”, see ARISTOTLE, The
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45 State of nature (§§ 4-15).
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commonwealth shall be employed for preserving the community and the members of it” (§ 143). Moreover,
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function of the executive power. The federative power deals with the international relations of the
government. John Locke observes that the two latter powers should not be separated. Conversely the
legislative and executive powers should not be placed in the hands of the same people, otherwise “they
may exempt themselves form obedience to the laws they make, and suit the law, both in its making and
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50 LOCKE J., op. cit., at 69-70 (§ 134).
51 In chapter XI of Book II (“Of Civil Government”), John Locke sums up his thought about the end of
men: “the great end of men’s entering into society, being the enjoyment of their properties in peace and
safety, and the great instrument and means of that being the laws established in that society”, See LOCKE
J., op. cit., at 69-70 (§ 134).
52 Yet this contract does not exist as a fact, see KANT, op. cit., at 79. Hannah Arendt also maintains that
social are fictions, see ARENDT H., op. cit., at 169.
53 KANT, “On the Common Saying: ‘This May Be True in Theory, but it Does not Apply in Practice’”, in
REIS H.S., Kant Political Writings, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1991, first published 1970, at
73.
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freedom of everyone else.” Public right is “the distinctive quality of the external laws which make this
constant harmony possible.” “Every restriction of freedom through the arbitrary will of another party” is
called coercion. See KANT, op. cit., at 73.
55 Although Kant rejects “Hobbes’ authoritarian view of sovereignty, his rationalism, his explication of
society based on a psychological assumption, that of the fear of sudden death,” Kant and Hobbes share the
fundamental question, that is how to turn a state of war into a state of order and peace (see Reiss’s
introduction to Kant’s Political Writings, at 10). Both thinkers propose a coherent argument based on a
appeal to reason, yet their solution to the transition from a state of war to a state of peace and security
differs.
56 KANT, op. cit., at 73.
57 According to Kant, a constitution should “guarantee everyone his freedom within the law, so that
each remains free to seek happiness in whatever way he thinks best, so long as he does not violate the
lawful freedom and rights of his fellow subjects at large” (KANT, op. cit., at 80).
58 OAKEHOTT M., op. cit., at 45.
59 Ibid.
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subdue. The principal task of the superficial order is to maintain the deeper order and to ‘improve’ it in the
sense of adjusting its explicit arrangements as changing circumstances seem to require”, OAKEHOTT M., op.
cit., at xix-xx.
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Arendt urges man to engage in political action, Strauss encourages man to first engage in philosophical
activity. See VILLA D. R., “The Philosopher versus the Citizen: Arendt, Strauss, and Socrates”, in Political
Theory, Vol. 26, No. 2, 1998, pp. 147-172.
63 Hence, in representative systems, there is not a full political participation.
64 ARENDT H., On Revolution, at 169.
65 Ibid., at 170.
66 For example, “the rupture between king and parliament […] threw the whole French nation into a
‘state of nature’; it dissolved automatically the political structure of the country as well as the bonds
among its inhabitants”, Ibid., at 180.
67 Ibid., at 174.
68 See ARENDT H., op. cit., at 174
69 Rousseau’s idea of the “bon sauvage”. Yet, it does not mean that men are incapable of establishing
good government from reflection and choice, i.e., Publius hopes that “they are not forever destined to
depend for their political constitutions on accident and force”, HAMILTON A., JAY J., MADISON J., op. cit., at 1
(No. 1).
70 ARENDT H., op. cit., at 175.
71 Ibid., at 147.
72 Aristotle defines the regime as “an arrangement of a city with respect to its offices, particularly the
one that has authority over all [matters]. For what has authority in the city is everywhere the governing
body, and the governing body is the regime”, ARISTOTLE, The Politics, at. 94 (book III.6).
73 Ibid., at 95-96 (book III.7)
74 Ibid. Furthermore, in book IV, chapters 8 and 9, Aristotle introduces the regime called polity. Strictly
speaking, it is a mixture of oligarchy and monarchy, see ARISTOTLE, The Politics, at. 129-132 (book IV.8-9).
75 ARISTOTLE, op. cit., at. 108 (book III.13).
76 In book IV, chapter 11, when judging what regime is best, Aristotle emphasizes “the middling sort”:
“it is clear […] that the political partnership that depend on the middling sort is best […], and those cities
are capable of being well governed in which the middling element is numerous […]”, ARISTOTLE, op. cit., at.
134 (book III.11). In addition, Aristotle asserts that “judgment in all these matters [what is the best
regime] rests on the same elements” (Ibid., at 133); they rest on the definition of ethics. The political
principals follow the ethical principles.
77 Ibid., at 99 (book III.9).
78 HAMILTON A., JAY J., MADISON J., The Federalist Papers, New York, Mentor, 1999, at 39-52 (No. 9-10).
79 A republic is a government in which the authority is elected via a system of representation.
80 According to the anti-federalists, in a large territory, the people would not get involved and thus a few
people would be in charge, probably guided by their own self-interests, leading the nation towards
despotism or anarchy.
81 An extended size allows a greater variety of interests and parties as well as a fitter choice of
representatives, which counter-effect the effects of factions, since there are more candidates to chose
from. Plus, there is a larger diversity of inclinations, passions and interests.
82 The system of representation, which, especially on a large territory, filters out the factional impulses.
In addition, the mechanisms of checks and balances play an important task in the distribution of power.
Publius notices that the risk of the domination by the legislative branch – because of its closeness to the
people and the assumption that the legislative branch “speaks for all”, which is not necessarily true – calls
for the fortification of the executive against this potential danger; the other branches must protect the
rights of the minorities. Above all, the system must be designed to protect the liberties and rights.
(HAMILTON A., JAY J., MADISON J., op. cit., at 268-285 (No. 47-49).
83 In the tenth federalist paper, the Fathers write that “the causes of faction cannot be removed and
that relief is only to be sought in the means of controlling its effects.” To do so, it  requires either
destroying liberty or giving to the people the same passions and interests. Following Aristotle, one could
suggest to reach that goal by way of education; however, Madison, arguably influenced by Hume who has
a skeptical view on human nature, contends that education cannot attain that goal.
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Fail”. According to MacIntyre, the enlightenment project was doomed to fail because it relies on two
ancient premises (a certain view of untutored-human-nature-as-it-is and a set of moral injunctions) but
has rejected the third premise (man-as-he-could-be-if-he-realized-his-telos) although it is needed to link
the two first premises.   
85 This enlarging and refining process is made possible through the elections, especially on a large
territory (since more candidates compete for offices).
86 In his essay On the Common Saying, Kant describes the test of rightfulness (of every public law): “if
the law is such that a whole people could not possibly agree to it, it is unjust; but if it is at least possible
that a people could agree to it, it is our duty to consider the law as just, even if some people would refuse
their consent if they were consulted”, KANT, On the Common Saying, at 85.
87 And therefore, “we have to understand each philosophy in terms of the historical context of tradition,
social order, and conflict out of which it emerged”, MACINTYRE A., Whose Justice? Which Rationality?, at 390.
88 In the editor’s introduction Timothy Fuller refers to Oakeshott’s essay On Human Conduct where
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“presupposes a single, unifying purpose”, the former, as a colony of porcupines, is based “on civility and
procedure rather than on a uniting purpose to which only some will ever willingly grant approval”, FULLER
T. in OAKESHOTT M., op. cit., at xiii.
89 ARISTOTLE, op. cit., at. 147-149 (book V.1).
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much detail seven beginning points of factional conflicts or in chapter 8, he gives the leaders ten
recommendations to preserve the regime.
91 ARISTOTLE, op. cit., at. 162-181 (book V.8-12).
92 For Leslie Goldstein, “Locke is seeking an answer to the question whether reason, employed as a tool
to serve the natural impulse to comfortable self-preservation, suggests that there must be limits on the
power of government, and, if so, what mechanism can enforce those limits?” GOLDSTEIN L. F., “Aristotle’s
Theory of Revolution: Looking at the Lockean Side”, Political Research Quarterly, Vol. 54, No. 2, June,
2001, pp. 311-331. In that article, Leslie Goldstein argues that there is a surprising degree of similarity
between Aristotle’s and Locke’s theory of revolution.
93 LOCKE J., op. cit., at 50-51 (§ 94), at 77-78 (§ 149) 87-88 (§ 168), at 104-106 (§§ 205-210), at 113-
116 (§§ 224-230).
94 LOCKE J., op. cit., at 114 (§ 226).
95 Ibid., at 48-50 (§§ 91-93), at  72-73 (§ 137), at 114 (§ 226).
96 This idea can be found in a passage of the American Declaration of Independence (July 4, 1776): “But
 when a long train of abuses and usurpations, pursuing invariably the same object evinces a design to
reduce them under absolute Despotism, it is their right, it is their duty, to throw off such Government, and
to provide new Guards for their future security.”
97 KANT I., On the Common Saying: ‘This May Be True in Theory, but it Does not Apply in Practice’, at
81.
Kant’s principle of publicness explains the non-existence of a right of revolution. According to the principle
of publicness, “the people, before establishing the civil contract, asks itself whether it dares to make public
the maxim of its intention to rebel on certain occasions.” If the possibility to rebel is a condition of
founding a political constitution and thus made public, there is a right to revolt but if this were so, “the
ruler would not be the head of state; or if both parties were given authority as a prior condition establish
the state; the establishment of the state would become impossible.” Hence, Kant can conclude that “the
injustice of rebellion is thus apparent from the fact that if the maxim upon which it would act were publicly
acknowledged, it would defeat its own purpose. This maxim would therefore have to be kept secret,” which
contradicts the principle of publicness. See KANT I., Perpetual Peace, at 126-127.
98 KANT I., On the Common Saying, at 81.
99 This absolute prohibition generates a paradox between Kant’s condemnation of revolution in general
and his sympathy toward the French revolution. See, e.g., ATWELL J. E., “A Brief Commentary”, in Journal of
the History of Ideas, Vol. 32, No. 3, 1971, pp. 433-436; BECK L. W., “Kant and the Right of Revolution”, in
Journal of the History of Ideas, Vol. 32, No. 3, 1971, pp. 411-422; NICHOLSON P., “Kant on the Duty Never
to Resist the Sovereign”, in Ethics, Vol. 86, No. 3, 1976, pp. 214-230.
In The Contest of Faculties Kant refers to the French – and especially to their Revolution – as a “nation of
gifted people” (“The revolution which we have seen taking place in our own times in a nation of gifted
people may succeed, or it may fail”, KANT, The Contest of Faculties, at 182. See also Kant’s remarks about
revolution – referring to the French revolution – in the foot note ate the bottom of page 83 in On the
Common Saying). In addition to the acknowledgment of Kant’s sympathy for the French revolution, I
would suggest, following Beck, that he justifies the 1789 revolution by arguing that Louis XVI gave back
the right of sovereignty to the people by convoking the States-General, on January 14, 1789 (May 5, 1789
is the date of the gathering of the States-General). Therefore, the seizure of power by the bourgeois,
enlightened by les lumières of the French philosophers, was not in fact a proper revolution, since they did
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100 Contra Hobbes for whom the head of state has no contractual obligations towards the people.
101 See Reiss’s introduction to Kant’s Political Writings, at. 31.
102 KANT, On the Common Saying, at 85.
103 STRAUSS L., Persecution and the Art of Writing, at 25.
104 MACINTYRE A., Whose Justice? Which Rationality?, at 362-366.
105 ARENDT H., op. cit., at 21-58.
106 A war may lead to liberation and thus establishing negative liberties but not necessarily to a
revolution because people might not be free in the truest sense, that is enjoying free political speech.
107 Therefore in that respect, the French revolution did not truly free the Frenchmen.
108 Hannah Arendt distinguishes the notions of majority decision from the notion of majority rule.
109 In the words of Tocqueville “un ancient régime remplace un autre”.
110 Arendt ultimately raises the question that if natural law (as indicated in the Declaration of
Independence) does not anchor the Constitution, what does save it from arbitrariness, what does secure
the condition of freedom? She argues that there is a need for an absolute which she found in the way that
the Constitution was established: from the bottom to the top.
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